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Abstract 
Access to and distribution of natural resources have been since immemorable time at the root of 
violent conflict. Over the last few decades, international institutions, legal scholars and civil 
society started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison between resource commodities and wars. 
Current debates emphasise how through sanctions, global regulatory initiatives, and legal 
accountability the governance of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict countries has 
improved, although international law should play a greater role to support the transition to a 
durable peace. The aim of this article is to illuminate the biases and limitations of dominant 
accounts by exploring the influence of the resource curse thesis, and its hidden propositions, upon 
legal developments. Using the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions as a case-study, 
it shows how legal practices and discourses have contributed to a narrow understanding of 
resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or caused by weak/authoritarian/corrupt 
governments. What is obscured by the current focus on greed and ineffective resource 
governance? What responsibilities and forms of violence are displaced? Engaging with these 
questions allows to see the dynamics through which structural injustices and distributive concerns 
are marginalised in existing responses to these conflicts, how the status quo is perpetuated, and 
the more subtle ways in which external interventions in the political economy of the Global South 
take place. 
 
Key words 
Natural resource exploitation, war, international law, truth commissions, good governance 
 
 
*
 Lecturer, School of Law, University of Essex. I am grateful for helpful comments from many colleagues 
and for the opportunity to present versions of this article at several venues, including the 2018 Melbourne 
Doctoral Forum on Legal Theory and the 2019 Harvard Institute for Global Law and Policy Scholars 
Workshop. Special thanks are owed to Sundhya Pahuja and Vidya Kumar for their generous engagement 
with my work. I am thankful also for the constructive feedback provided by the two anonymous reviewers. 
Error and omissions remain my own. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Access to and distribution of traded natural resources have been, since immemorable time, at the 
root of violent conflict. One may think of how the high demand for spices in Europe (pepper, 
cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves) paved the way not only for exploration and trade-related globalisation 
but also for conquest, wars, and colonial empires.1 Yet, it is only over the last few decades that 
international institutions and legal scholars started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison 
between resource commodities and wars. To date, debates have largely focused on the 
possibilities and limitations of legal regimes and institutional arrangements to break that linkage 
and ensure that natural resources are ‘managed’ in ways that foster peace, sustainable 
development, and stability.2 This article intervenes in existing legal discussions, but it pursues a 
different objective. It aims to understand the emergence of legal practices addressing the resource-
conflict nexus by making visible the theories that shape international law’s engagement with the 
issue, their assumptions and hidden discourses.3 My specific interest lies in exploring the 
influence of the resource curse theory, which I contend has become a powerful framework to 
explain wars in resource-rich countries, on legal and institutional developments in this field.4 
At risk of oversimplifying, the resource curse thesis (also known as the ‘paradox of plenty’) 
describes the interaction between resource commodities and armed conflict in the following 
 
1
 See S. Zweig, Magellan (tr. Alzir Hella, Le Livre de Poche 2012). 
2
 See e.g. D. Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations (2015); D. Dam-de Jong, ‘The Role of Informal Normative Processes in Improving 
Governance over Natural Resources in Conflict-Torn States’, Hague Journal of the Rule of Law (2015) 
219; C. Anderson, ‘Sanctions, Transparency, and Accountability: The Missing Link in Natural Resource 
Anti-Corruption Efforts’, 48 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2017) 779; S.C. Wisner, 
‘Criminalizing Corporate Actors for Exploitation of Natural Resources in Armed Conflict: UN Natural 
Resources Sanctions Committees and the International Criminal Court’, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2018); C. Bruch and A. Fishman, ‘Institutionalizing Peacebuilding. The UNCC, Conflict 
Resources, and the Future of Natural Resources in Transitional Justice’, in C. Payne and P. Sand (eds.), 
Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission: Environmental Liability (2011); M.B. 
Taylor and M. Davis, ‘Taking the Gun Out of Extraction: UN Responses to the Role of Natural Resources 
in Conflicts’, in C. Bruch, C. Muffett, and S. Nichols (eds.), Governance, Natural Resources and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding (2016) 249; O. Radics and C. Bruch, ‘The Law of Pillage, Conflict Resources, and 
Jus Post Bellum’, in C. Stahn, J. Iverson and J. Easterday (eds.) Environmental Protection and Transitions 
from Conflict to Peace (2017). 
3
 International law is understood here in broad terms, as including hard and soft law, international treaties 
and global/transnational regimes regulating both public and private conduct. 
4
 For references to the rich literature on the resource curse see infra Section 2. 
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terms. First, its proponents maintain that resource-rich countries often feature a combination of 
authoritarian governments, a high poverty rate, and weak governance structures that increases the 
risk of civil wars. In those contexts, natural resource revenues can be more easily diverted for 
personal benefit or purposes alien to the wellbeing of the population, which in turn generates 
grievances that — combined with other factors — may escalate to the level of violent conflict. 
Second, when conflict breaks out, governments’ failure to exercise effective control over 
extraction areas and borders, because of widespread corruption or patronage systems, facilitates 
the unregulated exploitation of natural resources by rebel groups, the prolongation of war, and 
associated human rights abuses. Third, a correlation is established between a transparent system 
of resource governance and peacebuilding, which results in the support for internationally 
sponsored interventions to restore state control over resource rich areas and promote a set of 
liberal values, such as good governance and accountability. 
The three broad claims associated with the resource curse thesis have been extremely 
influential on the international plane and resulted in the adoption of a variety of legal/regulatory 
measures to end wars fuelled through the exploitation of ‘conflict resources’5 and improve natural 
resource management in ‘fragile’, conflict and post-conflict countries. The most notable examples 
include commodity and targeted sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC)6 and multi-stakeholders initiatives, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
 
5
 The term ‘conflict resources’ indicates resource commodities, such as oil, timber, minerals, and diamonds 
extracted in conflict zones and traded to sustain the fighting. However, different international actors and 
legal regimes put an emphasis on different aspects of conflict-related resource exploitation. The NGO 
Global Witness focuses on the humanitarian impact of exploitation practices: ‘conflict resources are natural 
resources whose systemic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from, or result 
in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law or 
violations amounting to crimes under international law’. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
defines ‘conflict diamonds’ also quite narrowly, focusing on their exploitation by non-state armed groups: 
‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining 
legitimate governments’. See Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance, supra note at 26-27. 
6
 See e.g. UNSC Res. 1173, 1998 and UNSC Res. 1176, 1998 (Angola); UNSC Res. 1306, 2000 (Sierra 
Leone); UNSC Res. 1493, 2001 (Democratic Republic of the Congo); UNSC Res. 1343, 2001 and UNSC 
Res. 1408, 2002 (Liberia); UNSC Res. 2134, 2014 (Central African Republic). 
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for Diamonds,7 the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative,8 and the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance on Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals.9  
The consensus in the field is that, through economic sanctions, industry-self regulation, and 
legal reforms, the governance of natural resources in countries emerging from or at risk of conflict 
has improved, although international law should play a greater role in establishing the conditions 
for a durable peace.10 While recognising that questions of access to natural resources may be at 
the root of these wars, legal and institutional engagements with the structural dimension of 
resource distribution, which paved the way for the conflict, are rarely discussed in the 
scholarship.11 Yet, as the critique of the ‘liberal peace’ project tells us,12 a failure to address socio-
economic grievances underpinning violent conflict weakens the chances of real, positive peace.13 
Further, the focus on marketisation of natural resources, promotion of foreign investments and 
economic growth in post-conflict countries (although under the reformed legal framework) may 
reproduce inequalities and dispossessions important to conflict causation.14 
 
7
 https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
8
 https://eiti.org/ 
9
 https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf 
Other soft law instruments regulating the exploitation of natural resources in conflict zones (or ‘high-risk 
areas’) are the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism; the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for Extractive Industry Companies; the Equator 
Principles. 
10
 See generally the references cited supra note 2. 
11
 One notable exception is P. Okowa, ‘Sovereignty Contests and the Protection of Natural Resources’, 66 
Current Legal Problems (2013) 33, calling attention to the deeply-rooted problems raised by the existing 
regulation of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict settings, notably international law’s focus on 
the state as the main agent, inequality and subordination within the international legal order, and the 
preference for market-driven solutions which often reflect the interests of a limited number of states and 
industry representatives. 
12
 The concept of ‘liberal peace’ or ‘liberal peacebuilding’ denotes all activities implemented by 
international organisations (UN, international financial institutions, and NGOs) to promote stability, 
democracy and development in countries emerging from violent conflict. Criticisms have been raised with 
regard to the two dominant features of liberal peacebuilding: the promotion of free market economy and 
liberal democracy. For a review of critical literature on liberal peacebuilding, see e.g. C.L. Sriram, ‘Liberal 
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice: What Place for Socioeconomic Concerns?’, in D. Sharp (ed.), 
Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (2014), at 31-34; P. McAuliffe and C. Schwobel-Pattel, 
‘Disciplinary Matchmaking: Critics of International Criminal Law Meet Critics of Liberal Peacebuilding’, 
16 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2018) 985. 
13
 See generally J. Ahearne, ‘Neoliberal Economic Policies and Post-Conflict Peace-Building: A Help or 
Hindrance to Durable Peace?’, 2 POLIS Journal (2009) 1. 
14
 See e.g. M. Beevers, ‘Governing Natural Resources for Peace: Lessons from Liberia and Sierra Leone’, 
21 Global Governance (2015) 227; M. Beevers, ‘Peace Resources? Governing Liberia's Forests in the 
Aftermath of Conflict’, 22(1) International Peacekeeping (2015) 26. 
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This article builds upon these critical insights to examine the tensions, silences and 
contradictions within the international legal field. What are the effects of upholding through legal 
practices the explanation offered by the resource curse theory over alternative ones? How can 
representations implicit in the resource curse thesis delimit responsibility in the context of 
resource-driven wars? What forms of violence are made visible and what marginalised? To shed 
light on these questions, I will use the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions (TCs) as 
a case study. The decision to focus on these institutions is informed by different considerations. 
First, accountability mechanisms (such as TCs) are often presented as the vehicle to reconcile the 
liberal goals implicit in resource governance interventions with local demands for justice.15 
Second, the two TCs under scrutiny have dealt with the resource-conflict nexus from multiple 
angles, relying on a variety of international legal frameworks (international human rights law, 
laws of war, transnational/international criminal law, global regulatory regimes).16 Third, TCs are 
mechanisms created to recover the ‘truth’ about severe and widespread acts of violence committed 
in the context of armed conflict or repressive regimes.17 Examining their approach to resource-
related conflict enables us to reflect on the normative impact of the narrative(s) produced by these 
institutions.18 My argument is that the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TCs endorsed through their 
 
15
 See e.g. E. Harwell, ‘Building Momentum and Constituencies for Peace: The Role of Natural Resources 
in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding’, in C. Bruch, C. Muffett, and S. Nichols (eds.), Governance, 
Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (2016) 633; S. Nichols, ‘Reimagining Transitional 
Justice for an Enduring Peace: Accounting for Natural Resources in Conflict’, in Sharp (ed.) supra note 12, 
203. 
16
 While TCs are complex institutions, which perform different functions, this article focuses on their role 
as accountability mechanisms operating within a globalised field of transitional justice. The two TCs under 
examination addressed legal questions of responsibility of a variety of actors. International law provides 
legitimacy to these investigative bodies and the vocabulary through which they are called to assess and 
redress the violence associated with armed conflict. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the UN played a substantial 
role in the negotiation of the peace agreements that established the two truth-seeking mechanisms and in 
the implementation of said agreements. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights selected three 
international members of the Sierra Leonean TC and it was decided that the TC would be administratively 
managed as a project of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Also emblematic is 
the fact that the final report of the Sierra Leonean TC was presented to the UNSC. 
17
 See e.g. Report of the UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 2004; Report of the UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2011/634, 2011. P. Hayner, 
Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2011). 
18
 Critical literature warns against the partial view of the past that is developed by TCs and other 
accountability institutions and the consequences in terms of reinforcing a certain understanding of violence, 
victimhood, and responsibility. See e.g. V. Nesiah, ‘Theories of Transitional Justice: Cashing in the Blue 
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practice the values/assumptions underpinning the resource curse thesis in three ways: first, by 
attributing to local actors’ weakness, failure or desire for exploitation of natural resources as the 
primary causes for conflict; second, by exhibiting individual and physical atrocities as the main 
consequences of war-related resource extraction; third, by focusing on the reconstruction of state 
authority and good governance reforms as the way forward. 
One way to read the story told by the TCs under examination is, following Anne Orford, as 
a narrative of the ‘new interventionism’.19 Elements of the latter which are relevant for the present 
analysis are the focus on local origins of crises (or civil wars) and on the fault of the targeted state, 
portrayed as corrupt and authoritarian, while the peoples are described as being engaged in savage 
conflict. As observed by Orford, these narratives obscure the structural (and external) conditions 
that led to the conflict and become the justification for international interventions into the political 
economic life and institutional architecture of the ‘failed state’. These interventions, instead of 
being transformative, aim to ‘reaffirm the order, position and ideals that were threatened at the 
start of the narrative’.20 By showing how the TCs in Sierra Leone and Liberia supported the 
‘liberal peace’ agenda and marginalised structural injustices pertaining to the distribution of 
natural resources, this article illustrates another, more subtle way in which ‘the international’ 
intervenes in the Global South.21 
 
Chips’, in A. Orford and F. Hoffmann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 
(2016), at 790; A. Orford, ‘Commissioning the Truth’, 15(3) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law (2006) 
851, at 859-863; R. Nyger, ‘Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections’, in R. Buchanan 
and P. Zumbansen (eds.) Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (2014), 
at 217. 
19
 See A. Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of New Interventionism’, 10(4) EJIL 
(1999) 679; see also A. Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the 
Cold War’ 38 Harvard International Law Journal (1997) 443; A. Orford, ‘The Politics of Collective 
Security’, 17 Michigan Journal of International Law (1996) 373. 
20
 Orford, Muscular Humanitarianism, ibid. at 699-700. 
21
 Not all forms of political, economic and legal interventions determining how natural resources are to be 
‘managed’ in the Global South take place after armed conflict. One can think of how the internationalisation 
of the development project resulted in interventions of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund in the daily life of developing countries. Through conditionality, states are often required to 
implement policies/reforms aimed at fully exploiting natural resources located within their territory and 
privatising their extraction. On this point, see S. Pahuja, ‘Conserving the World’s Resources?, in J. 
Crawford, M. Koskenniemi and S. Ranganathan (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law 
(2012), at 407. 
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Section 2 provides an overview of the resource curse thesis and its core propositions as 
developed by political economists over the last few decades. Borrowing from critical perspectives 
within and across disciplinary borders, it draws attention to the limitations of the theory in 
explaining the causes and dynamics of resource wars in the Global South and how international 
law is relevant to these debates. Section 3 delves into the practice of the TCs in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia and explores to what extent the resource curse thesis shaped their approaches vis-à-vis the 
resource-conflict link. By illuminating blind spots in the reports authored by the TCs, this section 
discusses the effects of their selectivity on the diagnosis of the problem and recommendations to 
correct it. These should be seen as related concerns. If the diagnosis is inadequate, then 
prescriptions inevitably fall short of their expectations. Section 4 concludes by suggesting that we 
need to pay more attention to the power of frames in shaping legal practices in this area. Frames 
limit our understanding of the problem and the possibilities to achieve emancipatory ends, 
including through the law. What may happen if we change the lens through which we view the 
linkages between natural resources and violent conflict? 
 
2. The resource curse theory and violent conflict: an overview and a critique 
One central theme within the resource curse literature is the connection between the ‘paradox 
of plenty’, poor economic growth, and the likelihood of armed conflict.22 Within this context, 
resource commodities are defined in terms of their role in increasing the risk of civil conflict or 
acting as an obstacle to peace. At its core lies the idea of resource wealth as underpinning the 
motives for starting and prolonging armed conflict, or as a causal factor leading to corruption, 
 
22
 The canonical text is P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What 
Can Be Done (2008). Specifically on the resource curse theory and armed conflict, see e.g. M. Berdal and 
D. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars (2000); P. Le Billon, ‘The 
Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, 20 Political Geography (2001) 561; I. 
Bannon and P. Collier (eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts: Options and Actions (2003); M. 
Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil Wars? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’, 58(1) 
International Organization (2004) 35; M. Ross, ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil 
Wars?’, 41(3) Journal of Peace Research (2004) 337; P. Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and 
Armed Conflict (2005). 
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authoritarianism, abuses, and insecurity. While acknowledging the diversity and richness of this 
scholarship, for the purposes of this article, it is useful to identify three main strands in resource 
curse thought, which correspond roughly to the role of natural resources before, during and after 
an armed conflict. 
The first is the ‘greed versus grievances’ debate, which emerged in the mid-1990s to explain 
the causal relation between natural resource abundance and conflict outbreak. Collier, a proponent 
of the greed thesis, argues that economic interests are a key driving force behind rebellion and 
civil war, more than social or political grievances. According to him, ‘some societies are more 
prone to conflict than others because they offer more inviting economic prospects for rebellion’,23 
such as large deposits of high-value natural resources and other ‘lootable’ assets. Collier’s work 
has proved quite popular in international policy circles and has had an important impact on 
initiatives by the World Bank and the UNSC.24 Yet, the greed literature has been challenged by 
other political scientists questioning the nature of the link between resource wealth and conflict.25 
Steward, Brown and Langer, for instance, observe that ‘the conflict-inducing potential of natural 
resources is often mediated through their impact on HIs [horizontal inequalities]’.26 According to 
the grievance theory, unequal distribution of natural resource wealth, coupled with dysfunctional 
resource governance by unaccountable political elites, are factors potentially leading to the 
outbreak of armed conflict.27 A complementary and equally successful explanation of the nexus 
between resource commodities and war onset focuses on the weak state mechanism. Some 
 
23
 P. Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’, in Berdal and Malone (eds.), supra note, 
at 91-111; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil Wars’, 50 Oxford Economic Papers 
(1998) 563. 
24
 For a critical account of the reasons for Collier’s success among the political elites, see D. Keen, ‘Greed 
and Grievance in Civil War’, 88(4) International Affairs (2012) 757.  
25
 For instance, subsequent studies found that the nexus between natural resource wealth and armed conflict 
is influenced by a multitude of variables, including the resource type and the characteristic of a specific 
conflict. See e.g. M. Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases’, 58(1) International Organizations (2004) 35; P. Le Billon, ‘Natural Resource Types and Conflict 
Termination Initiatives’, Colombia Internacional (2009) 9, at 12. 
26
 F. Steward, G. Brown and A. Langer, ‘Major Findings and Conclusion of the Relationship Between 
Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict’, in F. Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict (2008), at 
294. 
27
 M. Klare, ‘Resource Predation, Contemporary Conflict, and the Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities’ in Rosenberg, Galis, and Zucker (eds.) Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention (2016), at 256-257. 
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theorists argue that resource-rich countries are often characterised by political and economic 
misrule, poorly functioning administrative structures, and endemic corruption, which make them 
less able to provide public goods and resolve social conflict.28 
Second, resource curse scholars have sought to explain how the availability of resource 
commodities is associated with the prolongation of hostilities.29 Through reference to the 
‘political economy of armed conflict’,30 this literature maintains that resource extraction provides 
rebel groups and governments with the revenues to sustain their military campaign (i.e. the 
feasibility mechanism) and represents an economic incentive to prolong the fighting (i.e. the 
conflict premium mechanism).31 The outbreak of an armed conflict, in other words, would 
generate a new political economy of war, where belligerent parties benefit from the situation of 
armed conflict and accumulate wealth through the exploitation of valuable commodities.32 
Building upon these explanations, reports by Human Rights Watch and Global Witness have 
documented the role of armed groups in the illicit trade of natural resources originating from 
conflict-affected countries and the linkages between local production sites and global markets.33 
Third, in addition of triggering and prolonging violent conflict, a relative recent theme is the 
role of natural resources in reinforcing the peace process and preventing conflict relapse. A 
growing literature is emerging to deal with the risks associated with environmental degradation, 
natural resource scarcity and maldistribution in countries recovering from armed conflict.34 The 
 
28
 See e.g. M. Ross, ‘The Politics of Resource Curse: A Review’, in C. Lancaster and N. van de Walle (eds.) 
The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of Development (2018) 201, at 212. 
29
 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars’, 56(4) Oxford Economic Papers (2004) 
563; P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, D. Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance, Feasibility and Civil War’, 61(1) 
Oxford Economic Papers (2009) 1.  
30
 See e.g. K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed 
and Grievance (2003). 
31
 Le Billion, supra note 25, at 13. 
32
 D. Keen, ‘Incentives and Disincentives for Violence’, in Berdal and Malone (eds.), supra note, at 26-27. 
33
 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold (2005); Global Witness, Faced with a Gun, What Can 
You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo (2009). 
34
 See e.g. C. Bruch, C. Muffett, S. Nichols (eds.), Governance, Natural Resources, and Post‐conflict 
Peacebuilding (2016); P. Lujala, S.A. Rustad, and S. Kettenmann, ‘Engines for Peace? Extractive 
Industries, Host Countries, and the International Community in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding’, 7 Natural 
Resources (2016) 239; P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad, High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding (2012); K. Brown, ‘War Economies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Identifying a Weak 
Link’, 3(1) Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (2012) 6; K. Conca, J. Wallace, ‘Environment and 
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assumption is that a failure to integrate environmental concerns (broadly understood) in post-
conflict strategies and policies may endanger the chances of a long-lasting peace. This 
interdisciplinary field of research and practice covers a variety of topics and its agenda is 
continuing to be refined.35 However, a fundamental area of concern is the reform of natural 
resource governance in post-conflict countries to improve transparency and accountability, kick-
start the economy, and generate peace dividends.36 As observed above, the idea that post-conflict 
countries need to correct institutional flaws in resource management as part of the peacebuilding 
process is high on the policy agenda and has received the support of international organisations.37 
Several global regulatory initiatives have been devised to assist governments in reforming the 
natural resource sector and ensure that extractive activities are conducive to peace (e.g. the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the EITI mentioned before).38 
Over the last couple of decades, the term ‘resource curse’ has entered the popular domain 
and has been used to describe how countries in the Global South, which are endowed with natural 
 
Peacebuilding in War-torn Societies: Lessons from the UN Environment Programme’s Experience With 
Post-conflict Assessment’, in D. Jensen and S. Lonergan (eds.) Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources 
In Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (2012) 63. 
35
 See e.g. C. Bruch, ‘The Changing Nature of Conflict, Peacebuilding and Environmental Cooperation’, 
49 Environmental Law Report (2019) 10134. The key areas of concerns for environmental peacebuilding 
are described as follows: (i) re-establishing states’ control over natural resources by curbing illegal 
exploitation activities; (ii) reforming natural resource sector to ‘jump start’ the economy; (iii) addressing 
land distribution issues as part of governance reforms; (iv) rebuilding basic infrastructures, including water 
and sanitation; (v) employing environmental remediation projects to foster cooperation, dialogue, and 
reconciliation. On this point, see C. Bruch, ‘Considerations in Framing the Environmental Dimensions of 
Jus Post Bellum’, in Stahn, Iverson, and Easterday (eds.), supra note 2, at 32-33. 
36
 See e.g. L. Whittemore, ‘Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource Governance: Lessons from 
Liberia', 17 Minn. J. Int'l L. (2008) 387. While recognising the diversity of perspectives associated with the 
environmental peacebuilding literature, my critique here pertains to how the concept of environmental 
peacebuilding can be used to support neoliberal peace approaches and political economic interventions in 
post-conflict countries. 
37
 See e.g. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/22, 25 June 2007; 
Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. 
A/64/866–S/2010/386, 11 June 2009; UNEP, Addressing the Role of Natural Resources in Conflict and 
Peacebuilding (2015). It is important to note that states have different views concerning the nexus between 
resource exploitation and war. See the discussion at the 8372nd Meeting of the UN Security Council, 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Root Causes of Conflict – The Role of Natural Resources, 
16 October 2018, UN Doc. S/PV 8372, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8372 
38
 Another example is the Liberia Forest Initiative (LFI), a programme established by the United States, the 
World Bank, the EU Commission, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the FAO and 
NGOs to assist the Liberian government in the implementation of legal reforms in the forestry sector, with 
a view to ensuring transparent forest management. 
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wealth, are unable to develop and cannot avoid declining into violent conflict. In the collective 
imaginary, wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to name a few, 
have been associated with brutal wars waged by rebels driven by the lust for ‘blood diamonds’.39 
The ‘simplistic and generalizing appeal’ of some of its propositions,40 resulted in widespread and 
uncritical acceptance of the theory by international organisations, civil society, and scholars 
across disciplines. Although some of the initial claims have been challenged for weaknesses in 
the methodology and revisited by subsequent studies,41 the hidden discourses underlying the 
framework have remained largely unquestioned. My primary concern here relates to the idea that 
violent conflicts in the Global South can be explained by ‘an internal resource-conflict nexus that 
is subversive of development, democratic governance, national, regional and global security’.42 
This idea is still dominant in the scholarship canvassed above and its relevance has transcended 
the field of political/economic sciences to enter the international legal domain through the 
development of soft law, regulatory regimes and accountability mechanisms. 
Yet, the resource curse, ‘when invoked as free-floating cultural explanation bereft of 
history’, can be misleading.43 Critics of the resource curse theory argue that its description of the 
causes and dynamics of modern wars is superficial, at least. To begin with, the theory appears 
based upon a ‘commodity determinism’, which ignores the historical and structural dimensions 
of inequality and poverty in the Global South, as well as the role of external actors, notably former 
colonial powers and transnational corporations, in producing such evils.44 As noted by Obi, who 
 
39
 See e.g. ‘Campbell Testimony Shines Light on Blood Diamond and the Importance of International 
Justice’, Global Witness Press Release, 4 August 2010, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/campbell-testimony-shines-light-blood-diamonds-and-
importance-international-justice/ 
40
 K. Lahiri-Dutt, “May God Give Us Chaos, so that We Can Plunder”: A Critique of Resource Curse and 
Conflict Theories’, 49 Development (2006) 14, at 14. 
41
 See e.g. J. Cuvelier, K. Vlassenroot, N. Olin, ‘Resources, Conflict and Governance: A Critical Review 
of the Evidence’, Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 9 (2013), 
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writes about oil, ‘blind spots in hegemonic discussions of the oil curse in Africa include the place 
of Africa’s oil in the global political economy, and how transnational actors and structures are 
deeply implicated in the corruption and armed conflicts in oil-rich states’.45 In other words, 
‘poverty is a not just a condition, but a relationship’, in which prosperity and deprivation are two 
sides of the same coin.46 As such, the theory does not answer a number of essential questions: 
‘what forces turn belongings – those goods, in a material and an ethical sense—into evil powers 
that alienate people from the very elements that have sustained them, environmentally and 
culturally […]?’47 Or, more essentially, ‘who owns the mineral resources and since when?’48 
Further, critical scholars highlight that the resource curse thesis is predicated upon on a view 
of the Global South as a place of ‘complete lack of control and disorder (…) whose inhabitants – 
by some irrational logic of nature – have found themselves endowed with resources that cannot 
or do not know how to deal with an orderly manner’.49 To put it differently, the theory is built 
upon a colonial fantasy, which imagines those who live in resource-endowed, developing 
countries as lacking ‘power, agency and authority’.50 Such analysis not only tells a partial story 
of the complexity of these conflicts, but has been invoked as the basis for neoliberal interventions 
that consolidate the control over natural resources by political elites and corporate actors, without 
challenging the transnational structures that generate inequality and grievances in the Global 
South.51 
These arguments raise the question of the relationship between international legal discourses 
and the political economic processes described above. The interrelation of norms of international 
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law and the continuation of colonial practices of dispossession is amply discussed in the literature. 
Scholars have shown how the development of legal doctrines has limited decolonising states’ 
sovereignty over their natural wealth. Anghie52 and Pahuja,53 in particular, explain how 
international law has been complicit in the exploitation, by foreign capitals, of natural resources 
located in developing countries, notwithstanding efforts to reassert control over them by the newly 
independent states. 
Next section illustrates the pervasiveness of the resource curse theory in legal practices and 
the problems generated by the support for its hidden propositions by the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian TCs. My critique of the two TCs should be understood as a critique of the broader legal 
discourse surrounding resource-driven conflict and is not intended to diminish the significance of 
their work or to offer generalised conclusions about their impact on victims. Rather, my purpose 
is to explore what understandings of responsibility, victimhood, and violence emerge from the 
approach taken by these TCs and how certain distributive consequences may be legitimised 
through legal practices. 
 
3. The political economy of TCs in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
3.1 Localising conflict causes and responsibility 
 
As seen above, one of the problems (which is, arguably, also one of the strengths) of the resource 
curse thesis is that it thrives on a simplistic, determinate relationship between natural resource 
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endowment and negative outcome, a proposition which conceals the much more complex nexus 
between resource commodities and violent conflict. Critical voices observe that this nexus is made 
by national-global linkages and involves a plurality of actors, such as transnational corporations, 
local and global elites, international financial institutions, benefitting from resource exploitation, 
trade, and accumulation.54 On the contrary, through the emphasis on either greed or institutional 
failures, proponents of the resource curse tend to focus on local drivers of armed conflict, which, 
from a legal perspective, translates into local solutions. A close reading of the reports authored 
by the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TCs shows how these institutions only marginally engaged 
with the responsibility of external actors and global market processes. Even when they did so, the 
recommendations put forward were narrowly designed, identifying actions to be taken by the 
government and on measures to improve the position of victims. 
Since Sierra Leone was a country with a massive diamond reserve, the competition for 
seizing control of diamond-producing regions by voracious African rebel groups and leaders (the 
Revolutionary United Front and Charles Taylor) is conventionally regarded as a main cause of 
the conflict.55 This belief has been questioned by political scholars exploring the broader political 
and societal context before the war. According to them, some of the problems caused by the 
abundant diamond reserve are more useful to explain the structural inequality in Sierra Leonean 
society, which later fed into the war. This economic inequality led to frustration among the sectors 
of the population who were excluded from the benefits.56 Several authors also argue that the 
conflict cannot properly be understood without reference to the marginalisation of the country’s 
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youth following decades of economic stagnation.57 Beevers explains that for international actors 
the central problem that needed to be addressed was the ability of rebel groups or corrupt 
government officials to loot resources and prolong the conflict. This explanation leaves out the 
more complex roots of each conflict, which are also linked to natural resources. He claims that, 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, conflict was enabled by resentment toward exploitative land 
relationships and the decision to make illegal the alluvial diamond mining that people relied on 
for their livelihoods.58 Struggles between local communities, extractive companies, and security 
forces are also part of the story of these conflicts.59 
The TC sought to contrast the mainstream account of the war in Sierra Leone, by showing 
the more complex interaction between mineral resources and armed violence.60 Yet, while 
refusing the simplistic idea of a greed-driven conflict, the TC focused its attention on the state 
and its failure to regulate the diamond sector before, during, and after the war. In the words of 
Schabas, who served as a TC commissioner, ‘the conflict was brought on by internal 
contradictions, not greedy outsiders’.61 He maintained that its origins were to be traced to 
domestic factors, namely widespread corruption, bad governance and the legacies of 
colonialism.62 
The TC went back in time and surveyed the operation of the diamond industry in the colonial 
period until the first years of the conflict.63 What emerges from this historical excursus is that, 
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the Machine (2007); A.B Zack-Williams, ‘Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98’, 
20(1) Third World Quarterly (1999) 143, arguing that the series of structural adjustment programmes 
deployed by successive governments in the 1980s and 1990s to receive loans from the IMF had a destructive 
effect upon vulnerable groups and reduced the employment prospects of the Sierra Leonean people. 
58
 M. Beevers, Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Governance after Armed Conflict: Sierra Leone and 
Liberia (2019), especially Chapter 4 (Liberia) and Chapter 6 (Sierra Leone).  
59
 M. Beevers, ‘Governing Natural Resources for Peace: Lessons from Liberia and Sierra Leone’, 21 Global 
Governance (2015) 227, at 230. 
60
 Report of the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume Three B, Chapter One, 
‘Mineral Resources, their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country’ (2004), paras. 7 and 8 
[Report Sierra Leonean Commission]. 
61
 W. Schabas, ‘Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice? The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court’, 2 J. Int'l Crim. Just. (2004) 1082, at 1086 [emphasis added]. 
62
 Ibid. at 1085. 
63
 Report Sierra Leonean Commission, supra note 60 para. 11. 
 16 
since diamonds became a major source of export in the 1950s, the profits from the trade went into 
the hands of a privileged minority.64 This aspect created ‘huge disparities in the socio-economic 
conditions. While the elite and their business associates in the diamond industry have lived in 
grandeur, the poor have invariably been left to rue the misappropriation of the collective wealth’.65 
The elites the TC refers to, however, are those in Sierra Leone and neighbouring African 
countries. 
The ‘international’ is not totally absent from the story told by the TC. With the boom in 
diamond exports, illegal mining and smuggling started as well.66 The Commission revealed the 
existence and persistence of transnational networks established by rebel groups, high-ranking 
government officials, and their business partners to manage the illicit trade and launder ‘blood 
diamonds’.67 While recognising the involvement of external actors and processes in the plunder 
of Sierra Leone’s wealth,68 the blame ultimately is put on the local government and its weak 
governance system. According to the TC, ‘the lack of total state control over the diamond industry 
and other mineral resources had major repercussions for the conduct of the war in Sierra Leone’.69 
The state’s inability to govern its territory allowed both the RUF and Charles Taylor, when he 
became Liberia’s President, to ‘benefit[ed] enormously from the diamonds that passed through 
Liberia’.70 
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65
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66
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TC recommendations on mineral resources are informed the resource curse’s emphasis on 
‘the local’. The Commission held that high-value natural resources ‘can fuel internal strife’, but 
the risk is reduced when people are aware of what the state earns from the business and how the 
profits are spent.71 This led to the recommendation for the Sierra Leonean government to regularly 
publish reports detailing how the proceeds from diamond exports are spent and how revenues are 
redistributed.72 I shall return later to the TC’s focus on transparency and ‘good governance’. It is 
important to note that, under the title of ‘Community Empowerment’, few recommendations were 
aimed at redistributing wealth from diamond exports for the benefit of communities in mining 
areas. The TC recommended that a higher percentage of export tax on diamonds be made 
available to communities through the Community Development Programme.73 While the primary 
significance of the tax would be symbolic, it tells a more accurate story of the conflict’s causes 
and remains the only (timid) effort to redress inequality as a factor leading to violent conflict. 
The Liberian TC opened up the Chapter on ‘Economic Crimes’ reaffirming the link between 
resource wealth and underdevelopment (i.e. the paradox of plenty). In the Commission’s words, 
‘despite its abundant natural resources, including tropical timber, rubber trees and minerals, 
Liberia has remained one of the poorest countries in the world’.74 It then maintained that, 
‘economic actors and economic activities played a crucial role in contributing to, and benefiting 
from, armed conflict in Liberia’.75 But who are those actors and activities? The TC’s focus is on 
how ‘economic crimes’ and revenues from illegal logging and mining were used by the Liberian 
political elites for personal interests and to finance the conflict.76 Relying on evidence produced 
by the Forest Concession Review Committee, the TC held that the Taylor’s government permitted 
timber companies to engage in illegal logging in exchange for loyalty, money and military 
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support.77 In return for privileged treatment, logging companies (for instance, the notorious 
Oriental Timber Company) facilitated the shipment to Liberia of weapons to be used in the 
ongoing armed conflict in violation of UNSC sanctions.78 
The findings above resulted in two orders of recommendations. First, the Liberian 
government was called to reform its legal architecture and ‘establish laws that will strengthen 
good governance’ over natural resources.79 I shall return to these recommendations in Section 3.3. 
Second, the TC recommended the prosecution and vetting of perpetrators of ‘economic crimes’, 
which I discuss in the next section. 
In sum, while the Sierra Leonean TC sought to complement (but did not reject) the 
predominant greed-focused narrative of the conflict by drawing attention to the institutional 
dimension of resource extraction in Sierra Leone, according to the Liberian TC access to high-
valued natural resources was the main driving force behind the prolongation of the armed conflict. 
Yet, even when the Sierra Leonean TC turned to the colonial past and discussed the role of 
transnational networks in helping smuggle diamonds out of the country, the blame is on African 
corrupt elites and the ‘weak state’.80 Likewise, although recognising that foreign corporations 
benefited from the absence of rule of law associated with the conflict in Liberia, the Liberian TC 
pointed the finger primarily at the Taylor’ regime and its ‘massive patronage system’, as 
responsible for the complete lack of control and disorder that enabled the perpetration of 
‘economic crimes’. In both cases, the dysfunction is understood to be local, so it needs to be 
corrected locally at the state level. 
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3.2 Marginalising structural and slow violence 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the linkage between the ‘paradox of plenty’ and violence 
is addressed by resource curse theorists and their supporters primarily through reference to the 
conduct of authoritarian/corrupt regimes or ‘greedy’ military groups involved in the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources (and, occasionally, their unscrupulous business partners). This 
has ramifications on how the human suffering associated with resource-driven wars has been 
framed and addressed by international and civil society organizations. Unlawful killing, torture, 
rape, displacement and forced labor in extraction areas controlled by military groups and security 
forces are considered the main manifestations of violence.81 In the same way, the most accepted 
definition of ‘conflict resources’ puts an emphasis on ‘serious violations of human rights, 
violations of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international 
law’.82 
The relevance of the human rights discourse appears thus limited to highly-visible atrocities 
perpetrated by local actors – the weak state or ruthless rebel groups – against the ‘bodies’ of 
victims. One way to explain this narrow focus, both in terms of responsible subjects and conducts, 
it to refer to the liberal conceptualisation of human rights, which has dominated (and to some 
extent still dominates) the international legal and political agenda.83 Critical scholars have pointed 
out how the emphasis of rights-based approaches on the State (as the duty bearer) fails to account 
for the interconnected character of the political and economic order, the power of non-state actors, 
and the different capacity of States to give effect to human rights – especially socio-economic 
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rights.84 Further, putting the liberal individual at the center of right discourses may come at the 
expenses of collective demands for more radical changes over the way wealth is managed and 
distributed at the domestic and global level.85 
As observed before, unequal access to natural resources and to the revenues linked to their 
exploitation leads to poverty and socio-economic injustices, which were at the root of armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. These injustices can be better understood as concerning the 
‘unequal relationship between collective entities or social groups’, rather than between 
individuals.86 Johan Galtung’s concept of ‘structural violence’ is to be recalled here as the scholar 
was concerned with foregrounding the structures that can give rise to acts of personal/individual 
violence and constitute forms of violence in and of themselves. Galtung directed attention to the 
distinction between the violence produced by a known subject, terming it ‘direct violence’, and 
that which occurs at the structural level when no distinct subject perpetrator can be established, 
calling this ‘structural violence’: 
There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The 
violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently 
as unequal life chances. Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income 
distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical 
services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all 
the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed.87 
 
Another useful concept to understand what gets elided in mainstream accounts of the 
suffering associated with resource-driven wars is that of ‘slow violence’. Following Rob Nixon, 
‘slow violence’ means ‘violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not 
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viewed as violence at all’.88 One can think of how aggressive patterns of resource extraction 
before and during conflicts result in land contamination, pollution, and environmental 
degradation, depriving local communities of livelihoods and other resources indispensable for 
survival.89 Structural and slow violence do not feature in the TCs’ discussion of the humanitarian 
impact of resource extraction associated with the conflict. 
In Sierra Leone, the TC was primarily concerned with abuses committed by military/rebel 
groups involved in the conflict to get control over or exploit the country’s natural resources. For 
instance, the Commission referred to two RUF attacks against mines owned by foreign companies 
in January 1995, during which the nearby communities suffered pillaging, burning of villages, 
forced displacement, and abduction of girls and children.90 The TC also described the inhuman 
labour conditions in diamond mines where RUF forcibly recruited workers that did not receive 
any remuneration and were subjected to torture,91 and children.92 Only in a short passage the TC 
took a broader perspective on the impact of mining and found that 
 
[t]he use and destruction of the land renders it unsuitable for agriculture. Even if the 
pits were refilled, the top soil is removed in the process of digging and therefore lost. 
This has a huge economic impact as it contributes to food shortages by disrupting 
agricultural production.93 
 
However, the slow violence associated with aggressive exploitation practices (food 
shortages, lack of employment opportunities) is not condemned under existing legal frameworks, 
rather it is acknowledged as part of the background. It is also absent from the prescriptions put 
forward by the Commission. 
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TC recommendations in response to findings concerning human rights violations associated 
with resource exploitation focused on selected issues. One is child labour in mines, for which the 
TC recommended the ratification of the International Labour Organization Convention 138 on 
the Minimum Age of Employment; harsher penalties for those who employed children in mines; 
and the enactment of further regulations to prevent the employment of children in mining.94 As 
for the protection of the rights of miners, the Commission held that labour laws need to be ‘strictly 
enforced’, in particular provisions establishing limits on working hours.95 The TC also 
recommended that resources generated by exploitation activities, taxes imposed on local and 
foreign corporations, and assets illegally transferred abroad during the conflict (once recovered) 
should serve to fund victim reparation programmes, including in the areas of health and 
education.96 
A different route was taken by the Liberian TC to address abuses resulting from conflict-
related extractive activities. The TC relied on the notion of ‘economic crimes’ as denoting ‘[a]ny 
prohibited activity committed for the purpose of generating economic gains or that in fact 
generates economic gains’.97 Such approach to the question of accountability resulted in the 
recommendation of more efforts by the government to fight impunity for ‘economic crimes’ 
through civil, criminal and administrative actions grounded in domestic and international law.98 
In addition to the prosecution of individuals that had committed criminal offences under Liberian 
law (e.g. bribery, money laundering), the TC recommended to introduce more severe penalties 
for violations of the law governing non-diamond mineral resources.99 In case the Liberian 
government decided to prosecute international crimes, ‘grave economic crimes’ should be 
included in the mandate of an ‘Extraordinary Criminal Court of Liberia’, and perpetrators should 
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be charged with the war crime of pillage.100 Further, the Commission recommended the creation 
of a reparation fund to compensate victims of ‘economic crimes’ to be financed through 
confiscation of illicit profits and repatriation of Liberian assets located abroad.101  
The ‘economic crime’ perspective and the support for the creation of an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal can be explained, inter alia, by the recent turn to criminal law in human rights 
discourses.102 In the past couple of decades, complex questions of armed violence, identity politics 
and wealth distribution have been redefined in the ‘expert vocabulary of international criminal 
law’.103 Yet, using criminal law to respond to embedded social injustices and collective 
responsibilities, such as those of transnational extractive companies and processes, has several 
limitations. While the TC recognised that economic dynamics of exploitation are related to 
patterns of abuses, it is telling that most (if not all) cases discussed concern physical atrocities 
perpetrated by security forces hired by logging companies to patrol their concessions or by 
military groups.104 The TC collected testimonies on human rights violations committed by these 
local actors against workers and communities living near timber concessions and mining areas, 
notably the forcible recruitment of child soldiers and killing of civilians.105 The localization of 
pathology, discussed above, distracts from the ‘culpability of those who benefitted from the 
system, even though they may not have the dirty hands in the more proximate sense’.106 Framing 
the responsibility of economic actors in criminal terms raises also questions on the remedies to 
redress and prevent further harms, beyond the punishment of perpetrators. The latter being an 
individualized response, it leaves structural violence (e.g. issues of access to natural resource 
wealth) outside of the radar. 
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The stories narrated by these institutions remain centred around episodes of extraordinary 
violence and individual responsibility.107 When structural and slow violence enter the picture, it 
is largely in the background. In other words, structural and slow violence remain the ‘context’ for 
the ‘real’ violence, on which the accountability institutions under study focus their attention and 
remedies.108 Justice, in this context, is defined in retrospective terms, as reparation for past abuses 
or punishment of individual perpetrators. Given the little attention paid to the beneficiaries of 
resource extraction, distributive questions and demands for social justice are pushed at the 
margins.109. 
 
3.3 Reforming the post-conflict state: internationally sponsored resource governance 
interventions 
 
One proposition of the resource curse theory is that armed conflicts break out because of the local 
government’s failure to exercise effective control over its natural resources due to widespread 
corruption, patronage systems, and absence of the rule of law.110 The ‘weakness’ of the state 
facilitates also the unregulated exploitation of natural resources by rebel groups to sustain their 
armed struggle and associated human rights abuses.111 These assumptions provide the ground for 
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international interventions in the form of commodity sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and legal 
reforms in the post-conflict country to restore the state’s control over resource rich areas and 
promote ‘good governance’.112 A correlation between transparent/accountable/participatory 
resource management, on the one side, and peacebuilding, on the other, is thus established as the 
way forward.113 
The Sierra Leonean and Liberian TCs dealt with the link between a corrupt and/or poorly 
managed natural resource sector and conflict. The Liberian TC maintained that successive 
governments were ‘either unwilling or unable’ to govern natural resources; therefore, armed 
groups could exercise effective control over extraction areas and corporate actors could generate 
profits in ‘an unregulated environment’.114 Likewise, the Sierra Leonean TC held that 
governments never succeeded in establishing complete control over the diamond industry because 
of widespread corruption and collusion between business actors and local politicians.115 Whereas 
efforts were made to improve the regulatory system, notably following Sierra Leone’s accession 
to the Kimberley Process, diamond smuggling continued to be significant because of flaws in the 
governance frameworks and ineffective law enforcement.116 
The solution to the problem is thus more transparency and better resource governance. In 
Liberia, the TC recommended that the government ‘must continue to reform its legal architecture’, 
and ‘revisit all policies of the past relating to the environment, natural resources, and the equitable 
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and sustainable use and management of these resources including land’.117 Some general 
principles were formulated to guide the government in such reforms, notably the need that 
resource exploitation be linked to national development programmes; that the Liberian people be 
involved in the decision-making process; that any damage to the environment caused by 
extraction activities be mitigated; and that institutions act in a transparent way.118 The Sierra 
Leonean TC also expressed the need for legal reforms of the mining sector. Among the 
recommendations qualified as ‘imperative’, it is worth citing the regular publication of a report 
on governmental expenditures of diamond revenues and the establishment of a fair and transparent 
system of mineral exploitation licenses.119 Other recommendations addressed diamond 
smuggling, for instance by enhancing border controls and eliminating intermediary dealers 
between miners and authorised exporters.120 Fairly enough, the TC also suggested reforming the 
Kimberley Process through the establishment of an external monitoring system.121 Lastly, to 
address corruption in the diamond sector, the Commission ‘imperatively’ recommended 
conducting an investigation of the actual beneficiaries of licenses held by relatives of public 
officials, as well as the publication of all mining license holders.122 
Except for the Liberian TC’s reference to more equitable resource governance and 
environmental mitigation, in both cases recommendations focused on reinforcing the state’s 
control over extraction areas and borders, increasing transparency in the management of natural 
resources, and addressing corruption of the local governmental apparatus. These measures seek 
to correct what are perceived as the major shortcomings of war-torn countries and are in line with 
parallel initiatives by the UNSC and other global governance bodies.123 While well-intended, 
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however, they fail to go at the root of the problem. To being with, as scholars have observed in 
other contexts, they put an emphasis on the post-conflict state as the ‘primary agent of change’124 
and on technical/legal reforms at the national level.125 By doing so, they leave outside the picture 
the systemic changes that are needed to ensure that extraction of natural resources does not 
contribute to further violent conflict and abuses. One can see the limitations of this approach with 
regard to corruption. The idea that corruption can be localised in Sierra Leone and Liberia and 
that it can be fought by changing the legal landscape in these countries is reinforced by the practice 
of the two TCs. Yet, as commentators have pointed out, focusing on the moment of the encounter 
between the public official and the private actor is insufficient and can actually distract from more 
effective strategies.126  
The TCs’ support for good governance, accountability, and transparency is better understood 
as part of the liberal peace project, which has dominated the international agenda since the end of 
the Cold War.127 In our case, it is assumed that a liberal democratic government, which effectively 
controls and manages the natural resource sector in a way that supports economic development, 
will ensure peace and security. Law reforms are thus to be undertaken in order to create a climate 
of stability conducive of domestic and foreign private investment in extractive activities. 
International rules and practices, such as the EITI, Kimberley Process and UNSC resolutions, are 
the standards against which the post-conflict state’s capacity to manage its natural resources is 
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assessed. The political and economic values underpinning the liberal peace agenda, such as the 
promotion of free market and foreign investments and the protection of property rights are thus 
indirectly championed by the two TCs.128 It remains debated, however, whether the speed 
resumption of natural resource extraction both in Liberia and Sierra Leone has reinforced or 
undermined the peace process.129 
Perhaps even more problematic is that, by focusing on stabilising the country and spurring 
economic growth, both perceived as prerequisite of post-conflict transition, the measures 
sponsored by the two TCs have failed to address factors understood to have led to the conflict, 
including resentment over resource ownership and benefit sharing. Admittedly, TCs 
recommendations did not seek to correct inequalities and tensions created by the past governance 
of natural resources and only marginally challenged the transfer of wealth and decision-making 
power from local communities. In other words, they dealt only the symptoms (lack of security 
and corruption) rather than the structural dimensions of resource exploitation and its relationship 
with armed conflict.130 As argued by the critique of liberal peacebuilding, the dangers inherent in 
such approaches is that promoting economic development without dealing with past grievances 
over resource distribution and structural violence may lead to the revival of old grievances or 
create new ones.131 
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4. Conclusion: re-establishing the status quo 
Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi.132 
This article has questioned the existing, dominant discourse surrounding resource extraction 
in conflict and post-conflict settings and how such discourse has shaped the development and 
circulation of legal practices, including the work of TCs. While the resource curse theory is never 
explicitly invoked as the basis for international normative and institutional interventions in this 
area, its core propositions have been endorsed by UN bodies and NGOs and entered academic 
debates. Using the armed conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia as a case study, I have called 
attention to the problems inherent in the hidden propositions within the resource curse thesis and 
its simplified understanding of resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or 
caused by corrupt/failed/weak states. Framing resource-related conflict in these terms has three 
impacts on the development of international norms. First, the responsibility of external actors 
(former colonial powers and transnational corporations) and economic processes of production 
and consumption are left at the margins of the picture. Second, structural and slow violence 
resulting from unequal access to and distribution of natural resources and ecological degradation 
are silenced. Third, by identifying internationally-sponsored ‘good governance’ reforms as the 
way forward, the values underpinning the liberal peace agenda are reinforced through legal 
arrangements, with the risk of recreating the same dynamics of dispossession that paved the way 
for conflict. 
The paradox at the hearth of Tomasi di Lampedusa’s The Leopard is thus perhaps a paradox 
at the hearth of the field. If questions of redistribution are central to these conflicts, can ‘justice’ 
be achieved when these concerns are discounted? Or to put it in other words ‘[t]o what extent 
does a process that ignores the aspirations of the vast majority of victims risk turning 
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disappointment into frustration and outrage’?133 In Sierra Leone, international efforts to revive 
industrial mining (albeit under the reformed legal framework) have helped re-create previous 
arrangements and tensions between communities and mining corporations. Despite the rhetoric 
of inclusion, the ability of people on the ground to be involved in decision-making remains 
insignificant. Promises by extractive industry are not kept, land is seized, the environment is 
degraded, and police continue to use disproportionate force in mining disputes.134 Illuminating 
the influence of the resource curse thesis on the work of the two TCs helps understand why ‘post-
conflict’ countries seem trapped in a spiral of violence and how legal practices may (more or less 
inadvertently) support interventions in the political economy of the Global South, which re-
establish previous patterns of exploitation. 
Ultimately, this article is a reminder of the risks of accepting a certain vision of the world as 
a given and using it to develop policies and normative solutions without questioning the structures 
and values upon which that vision is premised. It is an attempt ‘to defamiliarize these ways of 
imagining the world and is a first step in addressing the argument that understanding the world in 
that way is somehow normal’.135 The hope is that, once exposed, these structures and values can 
be contested and the law be engaged to counter the ‘injustices of everyday life’.136 
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